



A Threat to the Peace

*North Viet-Nam's Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam*

WAR

**Monograph File
Indochina Archive
University of California**

1961

A Threat to the Peace

*North Viet-Nam's Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam*

In Two Parts

PART I

PART II—A separate publication—
consists of the appendices
referred to in Part I

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7308

Far Eastern Series 110

Released December 1961

Office of Public Services

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

**For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C. Price 25 cents**

“The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam and subjugate its peoples is a threat to the peace. The independence and territorial integrity of that free country is of major and serious concern not only to the people of Viet-Nam and their immediate neighbors but also to all other free nations.”

**Secretary of State Dean Rusk
at his news conference on
November 17, 1961**



Contents

	Page
Introduction	1
I. The Background	3
II. The Setting (South Viet-Nam)	5
III. The Pattern of Viet Cong Activity in the South	7
A. The Military Pattern	7
B. The Political Pattern	10
C. The Use of Terror	12
IV. Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam	14
V. The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam	18
A. Political Organization	18
B. Military Organization	19
C. Intelligence Organization	20
VI. Evidence of External Guidance and Support of the Viet Cong	23
A. Background	23
B. Infiltration of Agents	24
1. The An Don Case	25
2. The Do Dinh Hai Case	26
C. Infiltration of Military Personnel	27
1. The Calu Case	28
2. The Tra Bong Case	28
3. The Dakrotah Case	29
4. The Le Hoa Case	29
5. The Diary of Nguyen Dinh Kieu	30
D. Introduction of Supplies From the North	32
1. The Calu Case (#2)	32
2. The Ly Son Case	33
3. Northern Maps of the South	36
4. Medical Equipment From North Viet-Nam and the Communist Bloc	37
E. Laos as a Base and a Route for the Viet Cong	38
1. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos	39
2. The Movement of North Vietnamese Troops From Laos Into South Viet-Nam	40

VI. Evidence of External Guidance and Support of
the Viet Cong—Continued

Page

F. The Goal of the "Liberation" Movement:

Communist Control Over All Viet-Nam 43

1. Communist Party Cadres in the South 43

2. Party Leadership of Front Organizations 44

3. Calls for More Aggressive Action 46

4. The Policy of Forceible Seizure of Power 46

5. Party Policy Toward the Front 47

6. Deceptive Appeal for Broad Support of the "Liberation" Movement Is a Temporary Policy of the Communist Party 48

7. Policy of Violence by the Viet Cong 48

VII. The Present Danger 49

VIII. Conclusions 51

A. The Meaning of a Viet Cong Victory 51

B. The Need for Action 52

Introduction

On September 25, 1961, in an address to the United Nations, President Kennedy warned that body and the people of the world of the dangers of "the smoldering coals of war in south-east Asia." Nowhere do those coals glare more ominously than in South Viet-Nam. While attention is diverted elsewhere—to Berlin, to negotiations over Laos, to turmoil in the Congo, to the United Nations itself, as well as to dozens of other problems—the Communist program to seize South Viet-Nam moves ahead relentlessly.

It is a program that relies on every available technique for spreading disorder and confusion in a peaceful society. Today it may call for the murder of a village chief known to be unfriendly to the Communists; tomorrow it may produce an attack in battalion strength against an outpost of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam. No tactic, whether of brutal terror, armed action, or persuasion, is ignored. If mining a road will stop all transport, who cares that a school bus may be the first vehicle to pass? If halting rice shipments means that many people go hungry, perhaps they will blame it on the Government. If people object to paying taxes to both the Communists and to the Government in Saigon, they are urged to refuse the latter.

The basic pattern of Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist) activity is not new, of course. It operated, with minor variations, in China, and Mao Tse-tung's theories on the conduct of guerrilla warfare are known to every Viet Cong agent and cadre. Most of the same methods were used in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Cuba, and in Laos. If there is anything peculiar to the Viet-Nam situation, it is that the country is divided and one-half provides a safe sanctuary from which subversion in the other half is directed and supported with both personnel and materiel.

What follows is a study of Viet Cong activities in South Viet-Nam and of the elaborate organization in the North that supports those activities. The Communists have made the

most elaborate efforts to conceal their role and to prevent any discoveries that would point an accusing finger at them for causing what is happening. But their efforts have not been totally successful.

In such a large-scale operation there are always some failures. There are defections. There are human frailties and some misjudgment. In major military operations prisoners are taken and documents are seized. All these and more have occurred in Viet-Nam. Over the years the authorities in Saigon have accumulated a mass of material exposing the activities of the Viet Cong.

This report is based on an extensive study of much of that material. It relies on documentary and physical evidence and on the confessions of many captured Viet Cong personnel. Officials of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam gave unselfishly of their time and their expert advice in connection with this investigation. Countless individuals and agencies responsible for gathering and interpreting this kind of evidence contributed to the research that went into this report. Without their cooperation and help, it obviously would not have been possible.

The specific cases cited herein have been presented, as they occurred, to the International Control Commission in Saigon by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Most recently, that Government made an elaborate presentation to the I.C.C. on October 24, 1961, of the data available at that time of Communist-directed subversion in South Viet-Nam. The presentation was accompanied by a request that the I.C.C. investigate. The Government in Saigon generously made available this same information for the compilation of this report.

What emerges from this study is a detailed, but by no means exhaustive, picture of Viet Cong operations and of the program of the Communist government in Hanoi to win power over all Viet-Nam. The Government of the United States believes that picture should be presented to the world.

There can be no doubt that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is fighting for its life. Those who would help the people of South Viet-Nam to remain outside the Communist orbit must have a thorough appreciation of the nature of that fight and of the way it is being conducted by the authorities in Hanoi and their disciplined followers in the South.

I. *The Background*

Even as they were negotiating the Geneva Accords that ended the Indochina war in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all of Viet-Nam. Trained and well-disciplined party members were picked to remain in the South to promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were cached in hundreds of carefully selected spots throughout South Viet-Nam. During the months after the Geneva Agreement went into effect, most of the military units loyal to Ho Chi Minh were transferred to North Viet-Nam; but some of the best-trained guerilla units moved to remote and inaccessible regions in the South, particularly to mountainous areas along the Cambodian and Lao borders and to jungle regions in the southern delta. Individual agents and many members of Communist cells were told to stay in place, to lead normal lives, and to wait until they received orders to carry out party assignments.

It was the Communists' calculation that nationwide elections scheduled in the Accords for 1956 would turn all of Viet-Nam over to them. With total control over the more populous North in their hands, the Communists assumed they would be able to promote enough support in the South for their cause to win in any balloting. The primary focus of the Communists' activity during the post-Geneva period was on political action—promoting discontent with the Government in Saigon and seeking to win supporters for Hanoi.

The authorities in South Viet-Nam refused to fall into this well-laid trap. They were convinced that under the circumstances there could be no such thing as a completely free and democratic expression of opinion in the North. There was no satisfactory provision for effective general and impartial supervision of the proposed balloting. There was no assurance that the people would have a chance to hear any free discussion of the issues at stake. Moreover, the Government in the South

had never signed the Geneva Accords and was not bound by their provisions.

It refused to take part in a procedure that threatened its country with absorption into the Communist bloc. The refusal came as a sharp disappointment to Hanoi, whose political program for 2 years had been aimed at precisely that goal. The failure of 1956 was a severe blow to the morale of the Viet Cong organization in the South. Defections were numerous. Some broke away because of disillusion with the Hanoi regime, others because they realized there was hope for a non-Communist orientation for their country, still others because they opposed a new resort to force after the long years of fighting.

The period 1956-58 was one of rebuilding and reorganization for the Viet Cong. Defectors were replaced with new party officials trained in the North. Military units were given stronger support in both manpower and equipment. Recruitment was pushed. More and more, the Viet Cong units turned to the use of force and of terror. One purpose clearly was to win prestige and to give strong backing to their requests for support and aid from the people, the kind of support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to elicit. Another purpose was to embarrass the Government in Saigon and to raise doubts about its ability to rule effectively and to maintain internal order.

After 1958 the use of terror by the Viet Cong increased sharply. The control organizations in the North expanded and their techniques were refined. Political cadres and military replacements were sent South in increasing numbers. Infiltration systems—by sea and by land—were expanded. Local recruitment, through both terror and propaganda, became a priority assignment for all units. Communications between North and South were modernized. The effort to win adherents or at least collaborators inside the South Vietnamese Government and armed forces assumed massive proportions. Some specialists believe that, given the size of the country and the resources available, the effort by the Hanoi government to penetrate, subvert, and conquer South Viet-Nam is one of the most extensive of its kind in history.

II. *The Setting (South Viet-Nam)*

When the Republic of Viet-Nam was born in 1955, its economy was a shambles. Years of foreign occupation, wartime bombing, bitter fighting with the French, and internal battles with dissident elements had left confusion in their wake. Roads had been neglected and many bridges destroyed. Thousands of farmers had killed off their livestock and abandoned their paddy fields to seek the comparative security of urban areas.

Canals and irrigation systems were damaged and neglected. Disruption of the transport system had reduced sharply the flow of goods from suppliers to markets. The modest industrial plant was in disrepair. The departure of the French entailed a loss in managerial and technical skills. To complicate further an already serious internal situation, more than 900,000 North Vietnamese decided to move to the South immediately after settlement of the Indochina war in order to escape from Communist rule.

With this as a backdrop, there were few observers, not excluding the Vietnamese themselves, who thought the new Republic could survive. The problems seemed too immense, the available resources too meager. In most foreign ministries, and in Saigon itself, the estimates of the longevity of South Viet-Nam's independence ranged from 6 months to a year.

These calculations reckoned without the skill, the intelligence, and the pride of the Vietnamese. Their ingenuity and their determination to remain their own masters were somehow ignored by the pessimistic observers. The people and the new Government responded to the challenge far more energetically and effectively than even optimists dared predict.

Extensive aid from friendly powers, particularly the United States, was an important element in South Viet-Nam's surprising recovery from chaos. The fact remains, however, that all the assistance in the world could not have proved decisive had it not gone to a people who were exceedingly able and fiercely determined to survive in freedom.

The years 1956 to 1960 produced something close to an economic miracle in South Viet-Nam. Food production rose an

average of 7 percent a year and prewar levels were achieved and passed. While per capita food production in the North was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the South. The output of textiles in the South jumped in only 1 year from 68 million meters (in 1958) to 83 million meters. Sugar production in the same 1-year span increased more than 100 percent, from 25,000 metric tons to 58,000 metric tons.

Despite the vastly larger industrial plant inherited by the North when Viet-Nam was partitioned, gross national product is considerably larger in the South. In 1960 it was estimated at \$110 per person in the South and \$70 in the North. Foreigners who have visited both North and South testify to the higher living standards and the much greater availability of consumer goods in the latter.

The record of South Viet-Nam in these recent years is written in services and in improved welfare as well as in colder economic indices. A massive resettlement program effectively integrated the 900,000 refugees from the North into the economic and social fabric of the South. An agrarian reform program was designed to give 300,000 tenant farmers a chance to buy the land they work for a modest price. Under the Government's agricultural credit program aimed at freeing the farmers from the hands of usurers, loans to peasant families increased fivefold between 1957 and 1959.

Thousands of new schoolrooms were built and the elementary school population in South Viet-Nam increased from 400,000 in 1956 to 1,500,000 in 1960. A rural health program installed simple dispensaries in half of South Viet-Nam's 6,000 villages and hamlets. An elaborate malaria eradication program was launched to rid Viet-Nam of its most important infectious disease. Doctors and nurses went into training in South Viet-Nam and abroad to serve their people's health needs.

This is a part, a very small part, of the setting against which the Viet Cong launched their campaign of armed action, subversion, and terror against South Viet-Nam. It is a record of progress over a few brief years equalled by few young countries. It is a background against which to measure claims that what is happening in South Viet-Nam today is a purely internal rebel-

lion born of frustration and dissatisfaction and odious comparison with "progress" in the North.

The people in South Viet-Nam know better; so do the Viet Cong. The economic and social advances scored by the South Vietnamese up to last year made it clear that Hanoi's program for peaceful takeover had little or no chance of success. If they were to win, the Communists had to resort to force. It is significant that most of the indicators of progress—hospitals and aid stations, malaria eradication teams, schools, the transport system—became favorite targets for Viet Cong attack. It was a campaign clearly designed to harass and embarrass a Government, not to serve the needs and desires of a people.

Under peaceful conditions the indicators had been unmistakable. South Viet-Nam was outstripping the North in the same fashion that West Germany had exceeded the achievements of the "socialist" east. The leaders in Hanoi apparently could not accept that prospect. They decided on a course of violence, the pace of which is accelerating steadily.

III. The Pattern of Viet Cong Activity in the South

A. THE MILITARY PATTERN

The pattern varies from village to village, from district to district, depending on the extent of Viet Cong control. But the variations are minor. In general, the organizational framework of the Viet Cong military units is quite standardized throughout South Viet-Nam.

There are three kinds of Viet Cong soldier. One is based on the village. He receives no pay. Generally he works at his job—usually as a farmer or fisherman or laborer—during the day. At night or in emergencies he is available for assignment by his superiors. The Viet Cong like to have at least 5 and preferably 10 guerrillas of this type in each village. In villages largely controlled by the Viet Cong, a full squad (10 to 16

men) is usual. A village squad is likely to have a few land mines at its disposal and two or three rifles or submachineguns. Knives, machetes, spears, or other weapons are more common than modern firearms.

Halftime, irregular forces are organized by the Viet Cong at the district level. There are generally several companies of 50 or more men in each district. These troops receive half pay and so must work at least part time to eke out a living. They are both better equipped and better trained than the village guards.

It would be a mistake to assume that the Vietnamese villagers are searching out Viet Cong agents in order to enlist as local guards or irregular soldiers. Undoubtedly there are some volunteers. But the record shows that many young Vietnamese are dragooned into service with the VC. Some are kidnapped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed.

Last summer, an American radio correspondent (CBS) interviewed a young Vietnamese who had been captured in an action against the Viet Cong in Kien Phong Province. The "volunteer," Pham Van Dau, was only 17 years old. The reporter asked him why he had joined the Communists. He replied: "Because they took my father away for 10 days and tried to force him to join their organization. But my father refused. Then they took me and forced me to cooperate. They threatened to kill my father if I refused. That is why I joined them."

Similar statements have been made by hundreds of young men who either deserted the VC ranks or surrendered to the Republic of Viet-Nam forces.

The hard core of the Viet Cong (VC) military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. Soldiering is their job and they do it effectively. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

Some of the regular VC forces have been introduced from the North in units. Moreover, the leaders of regular VC units are almost exclusively men trained in North Viet-Nam although many are natives of the South.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnapped for ransom by the VC. The VC have often stopped buses, taken the money and valuables of all on board, given them a lecture on the "glories of communism," and turned them loose.

For the most part the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals and isolated or poorly defended outposts. They have killed hundreds of village chiefs and other local officials. In the past year, however, and particularly in the last few months, the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Several attacks have been carried out in battalion strength or more against fairly large units of the South Vietnamese Army.

Among the favored targets of the VC have been police stations, self-defense corps units, civil guard outposts, and small units of the South Viet-Nam Army. By hitting such targets suddenly and in superior force, the VC are able to assure themselves a supply of arms and ammunition. This reduces their dependence on the long supply line from the North. The weapons of the VC are largely French- or U.S.-made, or handmade on primitive forges in the jungles.

The Communists have avoided any large-scale introduction of Soviet-bloc arms into South Viet-Nam, for this would be too clear evidence of their direct involvement. However, as the armed forces of the so-called Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have been reequipped with new weapons from the Sino-Soviet bloc, their old weapons have helped supply the Viet Cong in the South.

The size of the Viet Cong regular units has grown steadily in recent years. Once estimated at approximately 3,000 men, the strength of the full-time Viet Cong elite fighting force is

now believed to be at least 8,000 or 9,000 organized in some 30 battalions. An additional 8,000 or more troops operate under the leadership of regular Viet Cong officers at the provincial or district level. These figures do not include many thousands of village guards, political cadres, special agents, bearers, and the like. The pace of infiltration of officers and men has jumped markedly since Pathet Lao victories in Laos have assured a relatively safe corridor through that country into western South Viet-Nam.

There are good reasons to think that Laos now provides not only a route into South Viet-Nam but also a safe haven from which Viet Cong units operate. Laos-based units of the Viet Cong are believed to have played an important role in large-scale attacks by the VC in the highlands north of Kontum and near Ban Me Thuot this summer and fall and perhaps in assaults in the northern Provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai.

In addition to providing a channel for troops and agents, the infiltration routes from North Viet-Nam into the South are used to transfer supplies and equipment. Much of the food needed by the VC is acquired locally through "taxation" or outright seizure. Armed attacks provide many of the weapons and much of the ammunition. But shipments from the North supplement these sources. There is also regular traffic across the mountain trails and by seagoing junks which supplies the VC with material for clothing and uniforms, medical supplies, communications equipment, tools, generators, and all the many things required by a fighting force in the field.

B. THE POLITICAL PATTERN

The content and methods of Viet Cong political activity leave no doubt as to its Communist orientation. In a transparent effort to give their movement a cloak of respectability and of popular support, the so-called "Front for Liberation of the South" was formed late last year. Within the front are separate "liberation" organizations—for youth, for the peas-

ants, for workers, for intellectuals, for women, indeed for every significant segment of society in South Viet-Nam.

However, seized documents, propaganda pamphlets, and indoctrination leaflets picked up throughout South Viet-Nam make clear that the Lao Dong (Workers) Party, that is, the Communist Party, is the vanguard of the "liberation" movement. As those familiar with the Communist movement know, this means that the "liberation" movement is directed by the Communist Party. The Lao Dong Party of the South is part of and controlled by Ho Chi Minh's Lao Dong Party in the North.

The Viet Cong organization in the South follows the familiar Communist pattern. The basic unit is the cell of a few persons in a village or neighborhood. Village units are subordinate to the district headquarters and these in turn are controlled by the provincial party headquarters. Above the latter are the regional or zonal headquarters which take their directions from Hanoi.

The pattern of political indoctrination is what one would expect—concentration on studies of "socialism," meaning communism; praise for and identification with the program and progress of the Ho regime in the North; promises of support for the "liberation" movement by the "socialist camp"; criticism of the "imperialists," "warmongers," and "colonialists" and their "puppets."

Through their propaganda the Viet Cong seek to appeal to every group in the South with promises of special attention—"autonomy" for minority tribal groups, land and freedom from usury for the peasants, education for the youth, "freedom" for the intellectuals, and so forth.

In addition to the party organization itself, close ties are maintained with the military units through a system of political officers assigned to all units down to the platoon. Party members often serve as part-time guerrillas. They provide additional eyes and ears for the military units, supplying reports on GVN military establishments and troop movements. They may be assigned to collect money or to gather food for the Viet Cong.

C. THE USE OF TERROR

While professing sympathy for the needs and hopes of the people, the Viet Cong has resorted to the most brutal forms of force and coercion in carrying out its program. It has sought by every available means to frustrate the efforts of the authorities in South Viet-Nam to provide the people with social services. It has made no secret of its determination to destroy if possible the legally elected Government in South Viet-Nam and to place that country and its people under the control of Hanoi. It promises improvements but does what it can to prevent those very improvements if they are carried out by the non-Communist authorities.

Assassination, often after the most brutal torture, is a favored Viet Cong tactic. Government officials, schoolteachers, even wives and children have been the victims. Literally hundreds of village chiefs have been murdered in order to assert Viet Cong power and to instill fear in the populace. The list of atrocities is long. A catalog of these activities has been assembled in annual installments by the Saigon authorities.¹ They make gruesome reading, even for a generation that is jaded with accounts of man's inhumanity.

A particularly brutal example was reported from Vinh Binh Province the first week in November. The chief of the Cau Ke district, Le Van Nghia, was killed when his car hit a Viet Cong mine. Killed with the district chief were his wife and two other persons. The official's two children, aged one and three, miraculously survived the blast, but they were killed on the spot by the Viet Cong who had prepared the ambush.

Kidnapping is another criminal technique commonly used by the Viet Cong. Often the victims are never heard from again. Sometimes they are returned after sufficient ransom has been paid. At times this method is used to get recruits when efforts at persuasion fail.

Recently, in a gesture of utter contempt for the International Control Commission (I.C.C.) which is charged with overseeing enforcement of the Geneva Accords in Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong

¹ See "Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists," published by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and dated July 1959, July 1960, and May 1961.

kidnapped Col. Hoang Thuy Nam, chief of the South Viet-Nam liaison mission with the I.C.C. He was seized by a group of armed men at his farm less than 10 miles from Saigon. Appeals for his release went unheeded. The I.C.C. refused to raise its voice in protest. Ten days later his body was found floating in the Saigon River. It bore the marks of awful torture inflicted before his death. It was a ghastly crime that shocked Viet-Nam and civilized people everywhere.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Viet Cong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings the Viet Cong succeeded in closing more than 200 primary schools in South Viet-Nam in 1960, interrupting the education of more than 25,000 students. The number is reported to have risen to almost 400 in recent months.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Viet Cong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the work of the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Viet Cong.

In short, anything that spells order or security for the people of the South is anathema to the Viet Cong (VC) unless it be VC "order" or VC "security," anything that represents service or public welfare becomes a target, and a man who serves his Government and his people is likely to have his name inscribed on the Viet Cong's "wanted" list.

In 1960 the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam claimed that about 1,400 local Government officials and civilians were assassinated by the Viet Cong. Approximately 700 persons were kidnapped during the year. In the first 6 months of 1961 more than 500 murders of officials and civilians were reported and about 1,000 persons were kidnapped. The number of acts of terrorism carried out by the Viet Cong in recent months exceeds last year's levels according to authorities in Saigon.

IV. *Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam*

The Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam have made no secret of their full support for the subversive movement in the South. The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam" and "to liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country."

The party congress agreed that strengthening communism in the North would "benefit the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the South." The party faithful were told that "in the South we must endeavor to rally all national and democratic forces, expand and consolidate the national unity bloc, isolate the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and speed up the struggle to strengthen peace and reunify our fatherland."

The congress resolutions dealing with developments in the South were proprietary in tone. The effort to destroy the legal Government was described as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

The Lao Dong Party did not advise or recommend but rather told its followers, North and South, what they *must* do. "We must pay special attention to . . ."; "We must unceasingly expose . . ."; "We must strive . . ."—that is the language of the party's resolutions regarding action in the South.

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the North called for formation of "a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique." Three months later Hanoi announced creation of the "Front for Liberation of the

South." This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the South; it is pictured as an organization established and run by the people in the South themselves. At the Lao Dong Party Congress last year the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally . . ."; "The aims of its struggle are . . ."; "The front must carry out . . ."—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the so-called "liberation front" even before its founding.

Clearly the Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and it hardly seeks what most men would consider liberation. The only accurate word in the title of the organization is "front." That it is!

When directly charged with responsibility for guiding and supporting the armed rebellion in the South, the Communist leaders in Hanoi call the allegations slanderous, unfounded, and provocative. At other times they are more frank in discussing their attitude toward the struggle in the South.

In his address to the Lao Dong Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the socialist revolution in the North and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South."

The year before, writing for *Red Flag*, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing:

"We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

In the same vein, the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the Lao Dong Congress of the need to "step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South." Earlier last year, writing for the Communist Party journal *Hoc Tap* in Hanoi, General Giap described the North as "the revolutionary base for the whole country."

Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked

at the Party Congress in Hanoi about the struggle in the South and the party's role.

After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Viet-Nam, Le Duan said:

"Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South—especially the workers, peasants, and the intellectuals—and must uphold the revolutionary fighting spirit of all strata of patriotic compatriots."

Later in the same speech, he said:

"In order to assure the complete victory of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam, the South Viet-Nam people, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the working class, should endeavor to build a worker-peasant-army coalition bloc, and set up a broad national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance."

Another high official of the Hanoi regime, Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ *Hoo Tap* in April this year, said that the party congress had called for "stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam." He wrote that the responsibilities of the "socialist revolution" in the North and of the "democratic revolution" in the South were "closely related and interdependent." He, too, referred to North Viet-Nam as "the revolutionary base common to the entire country." He expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal Government in South Viet-Nam because: "socialist North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification."

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Viet-Nam as follows: The "Liberation

Front" would succeed in destroying the present Government in the South; a "National Democratic Coalition Government" would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification "under one form or another." It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though South Viet-Nam will be liberated by non-peaceful means, the Party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct."

(Excerpts from resolutions of the Lao Dong Party's Third Congress and from speeches and articles by Ho Chi Minh and others cited above are included in Part II, appendix A.)

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Viet Cong effort in South Viet-Nam. It disseminates a heavy schedule of propaganda, of course, praising the regime in the North, hailing the real and imagined successes of other Communist states, and attacking the Government in the South and all who are friendly to that Government. Recorded messages from individuals directed to loved ones and family members in the South are broadcast regularly. Their clear purpose is to influence morale adversely and weaken the will to resist. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Viet Cong representatives in the South.

The clandestine radio of the "liberation" movement is but a pale imitation of Radio Hanoi. Most of its air time is devoted to rebroadcasts of programs transmitted first from the capital of North Viet-Nam. However, the Liberation Front radio occasionally originates broadcasts that are of interest in pointing up the front's activities and its relation to the North.

Viet Cong propaganda leaflets usually carry the hammer-and-sickle symbol of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party. Liberation Front pamphlets refer frequently to the leading role of the Communist Party. (The matter of Viet Cong and Liberation Front propaganda is dealt with in detail in section VI-F (see page 48).

V. The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam

The Viet Cong operation in South Viet-Nam has the backing of an elaborate organizational structure in North Viet-Nam. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Viet-Nam.

A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political guidance of the Viet Cong (VC) and, through VC cadres, of the “liberation” movement in the South is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the VC movement.

Overall direction of the Viet Cong movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Committee's organization a special “Committee for Supervision of the South” has been established. Three leading members of this special group based in Hanoi are: Le Duc Tho, member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party; Pham Hung, a Vice Premier of the North Viet-Nam government and also a Politburo member; and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh, alternate member of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee and chairman of the Board for National Reunification.

For administrative purposes the Viet Cong divide South Viet-Nam into two major zones: the Interzone of South-Central Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5) and the Nambo region. The former includes the highlands and coastal regions of Central Viet-Nam south of the 17th parallel; the Nambo

region is made up of the southern and southwestern provinces including the Mekong delta area.

Each of the two major zones has its own VC executive committee which operates under the Committee for Supervision of the South in Hanoi. Each zonal committee is directed by a secretary general and a deputy and has 10 or more members, each with specific responsibilities. Under the zone committees are a number of specialized agencies responsible for such things as liaison, propaganda and training, personnel, subversive activities, military bases, espionage, military affairs, and the like.

Each of the two major zones is divided by the Viet Cong into four interprovincial administrative regions. These regions include from three to nine provinces. Each interprovince has its own executive committee and an administrative organization patterned on that of the zone. Beneath the interprovince the Viet Cong structure is based on the administrative organization of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Party units are maintained at the province, district, village, and hamlet level. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined in part by the extent of Viet Cong control over the area concerned.

B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the responsibility of the Armed Forces high command in North Viet-Nam under close supervision from the party. These responsibilities include selection of key targets, operational plans, assignments of regular units, training programs, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like.

The subordination of the Viet Cong military effort to the political leadership of Communist cadres is clear. General Vinh is the junior member of the Committee for Supervision of the South in Hanoi. Brig. Gen. Nguyen Don, in charge of military affairs in the South-Central Interzone, is responsible to Tran Luong, a member of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee and secretary general of the interzone executive

group. The same is true in Nambo, where military affairs chief Nguyen Huu Xuyen is the subordinate of political boss Muoi Cuc.

C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cuc Nghien-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Viet-Nam. The Research Agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the Armed Forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the C.R.A. has become available from captured Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons. But it is possible to describe the C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

Also operating under the direct supervision of C.R.A. headquarters are a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center is responsible for maintaining intelligence

channels to overseas areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay which have contact with Hong Kong, Paris, and other overseas points.

A second special center is based in Vinh and is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Viet-Nam. The unit is based in Vinh-Linh in southeast North Viet-Nam. This center is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the South by sea, across the demilitarized zone, and along the mountain trails through Laos. The C.R.A. maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other neighboring countries.

Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong are known to have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Viet Cong units in the South.

Some C.R.A. units specialize in infiltration by sea routes. Others are responsible for controlling overland routes across the demilitarized zone and through Laos.

Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in the City of Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations.

Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the C.R.A. Often the functions are combined when, for example, a high ranking military officer with long party experience controls a region. He may, in such a case, represent the party, the C.R.A., and the military high command in Hanoi.

This is believed to be the case in at least three important instances. General Hoang Dao, a well-known officer in the North Viet-Nam Army, is believed to be in command of Viet Cong operations along the Viet-Nam-Cambodian border. Colonel Le Cau is both the intelligence chief and the senior commander in the western highlands region. Another colonel,

Van Trong, directs military and intelligence operations in the northern sector just below the demilitarized zone.

Each of the main centers operating directly under C.R.A. headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Viet Cong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.

(Charts of the VC organizational structure are included in appendix B.)

VI. *Evidence of External Guidance and Support of the Viet Cong*

A. BACKGROUND

The authorities in North Viet-Nam—the central government, the army, the Central Research Agency, the Lao Dong Party—have gone to elaborate lengths to conceal their direct participation in the program to conquer and absorb South Viet-Nam. In part, these efforts are designed to help preserve the fiction that the armed uprising in the South is an internal matter. In part, too, the effort appears a concession to that amorphous factor called “world public opinion.” In addition, the Communist leaders in Hanoi probably would like to be able to adopt a posture of outrage, should the methods being practiced by them in the South ever be turned against them in the North.

To help conceal the identity of its agents going into the South, a special section of the Central Research Agency in Hanoi is kept busy producing false identification papers, forged boat registration certificates, draft cards, and other documents. Military personnel are supposed to turn in all identification papers before they move across the South Viet-Nam border. Weapons of Soviet-bloc origin are generally shunned and Viet Cong troops entering the South usually are supplied with French weapons dating from the Indochina war or U.S. equipment captured in Laos or in attacks on military units in South Viet-Nam.

However, no effort at concealment carried out on such a huge scale can ever be completely successful. Viet Cong (VC) agents have been captured or have defected. VC officers and soldiers have surrendered or been taken prisoner. South Vietnamese agents have uncovered much valuable information on the Viet Cong operation. Other sources have provided additional details.