

Data from these varied sources provide a fairly detailed picture of what the Viet Cong is doing and of how it is directed and supported by the regime in Hanoi.

Over the years, the Government of South Viet-Nam has tried to bring details of this picture of subversion and covert aggression to the attention of the world. Primarily, it has done so by presenting evidence, as it was acquired, to the International Control Commission. Almost 200 letters detailing more than 1,200 incidents—everything from acts of sabotage or cases of assassination to large-scale military actions by the Viet Cong—are in the International Control Commission (I.C.C.) files. Thus far that body has not investigated any cases of subversion, just as it has not uttered a word of protest over the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam.

The reasons for this inaction are obvious. The Polish member of the I.C.C. will not favor any investigation that might embarrass the Viet Cong. The Indian chairman of the Commission has taken the view that any actions by the group should be supported by both the Polish and the Canadian members. This approach has prevented the I.C.C. from enforcing effective control over any violation of the Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam, whether it be subversion in the South or the illegal introduction of Soviet-bloc military goods into the North.

For the past 3 years the Government in Saigon has published annual reports on Viet Cong actions and atrocities in order to focus attention on the deepening tragedy of a people who want to be left alone but who have become the target of Hanoi's plan for conquest. These accounts of accumulating horrors in the Viet-Nam countryside do not make pleasant reading. But they throw some much-needed light on the "convert or destroy" methods of the Viet Cong.

## **B. INFILTRATION OF AGENTS**

One of the ways in which the Viet Cong and the authorities in Hanoi violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Viet-Nam is the introduction of espionage agents into the South. An earlier section noted the existence of a special unit of the Viet Cong intelligence organization that has the

specific task of training and dispatching its agents to work in South Viet-Nam. Sometimes these agents travel by fishing junks operated by the Special 603d Maritime Unit in Dong Hoi or by other infiltration groups. Others travel south along one of the many secret infiltration trails through the demilitarized zone, or through Laos. They may stay in the South for only a day or two—long enough to deliver and/or pick up messages—or they may go on extended assignments.

## 1. The An Don Case

ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 5, 1961, a patrol craft of the Tourane Naval District cruised along the shore of An Don, a waterfront area in Tourane on the northeast coast of South Viet-Nam. Its mission: to check on any suspicious persons or vessels. As the patrol approached a junk, one of the inspectors saw a familiar face. The inspector knew the young man's mother and knew that he had been missing for some time. Under questioning, the young man, Truong Van Hao, confessed. He and his four companions were taken into custody.

It was an important arrest. Interrogation of the prisoners disclosed the following.

Nguyen Chuc, alias Nguyen Thi, 34, was the leader of the group. A lieutenant in the North Vietnamese Army, he had fought with the Viet Cong against the French. After Geneva, in 1955, he went north though his native village and his family were in the South. Between June 1959 and June 1961 he had made 17 trips to South Viet-Nam on espionage missions. He was a member of the Viet Cong maritime liaison group in Dong Hoi, a port on the east coast just north of the 17th parallel. His assignments included transporting agents from North to South and South to North and carrying messages and secret material from and to espionage units in the South.

Chuc and the others all carried false identification papers, including draft cards, fisherman's licenses, and election cards. The registration papers for their boat also were forgeries as were the logbooks. Found aboard the Viet Cong junk were a miniature camera of German manufacture; a Japanese-made transistor radio; 8,260 piasters (about \$112) in South Viet-

namese money; 20 sheets of blank paper presumed to carry invisible writing; a book on taxation policy and economic development in Viet-Nam published by the Government in Saigon but not available to the public at the time of seizure; a copy of the latest Cong Dan yearbook (1960-61) published in Saigon which contained the names, addresses, and other data on all leading South Vietnamese officials.

Arrested with Chuc was Huynh Tinh, alias Le Nghe, 38, a warrant officer in the North Viet-Nam armed forces. A native of Quang Nam province in the South, he had gone North in 1955 with his Viet Cong unit, the 17th Battalion of the 93d Regiment. His experience with fishing boats as a youth led to his transfer in June 1960 to the maritime liaison unit.

Nguyen Dong, 58, was the third member of the group. A maker of fish nets and a fisherman from his youth, he had gone North in 1957. He said he had believed the Viet Cong propaganda that said that "life in the North was very happy" and "earning a living was easy." He said he participated in only five trips to the South.

Lam Dua, alias Le Lam, 32, and Truong Van Hao, 29, were the other crew members. The former came from Quang Nam province and the latter from Tourane. Both entered the Viet Cong movement through Communist youth group activities.

(Pictures and interrogation records of the five men are included in appendix C.)

The An Don case is but one of many instances of infiltration of agents and couriers from North Viet-Nam into the South. On June 15 the South Vietnamese intercepted seven junks coming from the North with 36 persons aboard. The latter carried forged papers. On June 17 six boats with 29 persons aboard were picked up by a patrol unit off Thuan An.

## **2. The Do Dinh Hai Case**

DO DINH HAI, 41, is a native of North Viet-Nam. An aircraft mechanic, he served with the French Air Force. During the last year of World War II and later he worked for the Viet Minh. In 1951 he went to work for a French airline and

3 years later he was recruited by the Viet Cong. When the French airline moved its operations from Hanoi to Saigon in February 1955, Hai moved to the South.

He reported on all air force activities, first of the French and later of the South Viet-Nam Air Force and its American advisers. Also, he helped service the I.C.C. courier planes which traveled between Saigon and Hanoi. Hai said the planes were used by the Viet Cong (VC) as a carrier for messages and it was his task to remove them from their hiding place on the plane and deliver them to a Viet Cong agent once a week.

In April 1958 Hai's espionage ring learned it had been exposed. He was told to drive his superior, a man he knew as Hong, to the central highlands. Hai identified Hong as Le Cau, the North Vietnamese colonel who now directs VC espionage and military operations in the highlands. From the area between Kontum and Pleiku, Le Cau, Hai, and several others made the long trek over mountain trails to the North. Two months later they arrived in the Vinh Linh special zone just north of the 17th parallel. They went immediately to Hanoi.

In August, Hai was ordered South again. He traveled by junk from Dong Hoi to Tourane, took a bus to Na Trang, and from there went by train to Saigon. He was arrested on August 28, 1958, by South Vietnamese security officers. Though still under surveillance, he works now as a mechanic in Saigon and has relative freedom. His story is available to any authorized official.

There are hundreds of such cases. Many have been brought to the attention of the I.C.C. and the Commission has declined to investigate.

## C. INFILTRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

If the traffic in espionage agents into the South has been a serious problem, the infiltration across South Viet-Nam's borders by VC military forces, officers and men, sometimes in organized units, has assumed ominous proportions. Sometimes they travel by junk from the North. More often they have

moved into South Viet-Nam along secret trails that cross the western portion of the demilitarized zone, a mountainous region of heavy forests. Now, with much of Laos in Communist hands, infiltration trails through that country have been used increasingly by the Viet Cong.

## 1. The Calu Case

ON MARCH 29, 1961, a unit of the Vietnamese Army located and destroyed a Viet Cong base at Calu, near Thuong Trung in the northern Province of Quang Tri. The Calu post was a way station on an infiltration route from the North. It was a place where entering Viet Cong personnel could stop for food and rest before moving farther south. Calu was Station No. 8 on the trail. Station No. 2 was on the North-South border at Bo Ho Su; presumably Station No. 1 was the jumpoff point just north of the border. Another identified post on the trail was No. 25 at Ba Ngai in southern Quang Tri.

Thirteen Viet Cong personnel were killed in the fight at Calu. A number of documents, maps, and some medical supplies were captured as well as rice and other food stocks. Most of the documents were Communist indoctrination and study pamphlets of a kind that can be found at any VC position. But several captured documents were of particular significance.

One notebook found at Calu contained a careful daily record of rice and other foods received and consumed at the post. A second notebook contained a daily record of meals served with full notations of the number of Viet Cong who passed through the post on their way into South Viet-Nam. Analysis of the records shows that 1,840 Viet Cong entered the South along the Calu trail during the period from October 1960 to March 1961.

(Photocopies of sample pages from the two Calu notebooks plus a brief analysis are in appendix D.)

## 2. The Tra Bong Case

IN OCTOBER 1960 a company of Viet Cong troops attacked the district town of Tra Bong in Quang Ngai Province. In the savage fighting that developed, 34 Viet Cong were killed. The attackers succeeded in carrying off the bodies of two of their men, one of them believed to be that of Nguyen Cong Phuong,

an official of the VC Interzone Committee for northern South Viet-Nam.

Apparently document control for this group of VC had been lax. Though they had no identification papers, seven of the dead had carried in their pockets pictures of themselves in the uniform of the Army of North Viet-Nam. Obviously they were regular soldiers in the North and had been assigned to fight for the Communist cause in the South.

(Pictures of the VC in North Viet-Nam Army uniforms are in appendix E.)

### **3. The Dakrotah Case**

A VIET CONG FORCE of about 1,000 men launched a series of attacks in late October 1960 against military outposts of the South Viet-Nam Army in northern Kontum Province near the Laos border. One VC unit, Company 3 of Battalion 20, concentrated on the outpost at Dak Dru. The unit was made up largely of highland tribesmen who had been trained in the North, but most of the officers were Vietnamese. After several waves of attacks against the outpost failed, the VC unit pulled back and withdrew across the Lao border.

Captured in the action near the village of Dakrotah while on reconnaissance were four VC soldiers, all members of highland tribes. One of them, Y Lon, told interrogators that he and other members of his group went North with their Viet Cong military unit (120th Regiment) in 1954. He said that about 6,000 or 7,000 tribesmen from the highlands of South Viet-Nam had been regrouped with him.

In June 1959, Y Lon and 29 other Viet Cong soldiers crossed into South Viet-Nam. They were used not only in military actions but also were assigned to spread Communist propaganda among the hill tribes in the South.

(Pictures of the Viet Cong soldiers captured at Dakrotah together with excerpts from Y Lon's interrogation record will be found in appendix F.)

### **4. The Le Hoa Case**

LE HOA IS A VIET CONG CORPORAL. He was born in 1931 in the village of Duc Lan in Quang Ngai Province. During the

Indochina war he was a member of the village defense corps. He later was recruited by the Viet Cong as a member of the district guard in Mo Duc. When the war ended, he went to North Viet-Nam with his unit. In June 1956 the Mo Duc unit was disbanded and Le Hoa was assigned to the 803d Regiment of the North Viet-Nam Army.

In June 1961, Le Hoa and eight members of his company were ordered to report to regimental headquarters. There they were told they had been picked for special training and would join the "liberation" forces in the South. After 1 month of training, the group boarded trucks at their training camp located at Vinh and began their journey to South Viet-Nam.

By truck and on foot they moved southward until they reached the Ben Hai River which divides North and South Viet-Nam. They crossed the river on July 22 according to Corporal Hoa's account. He reported passing through Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai Provinces.

The corporal told his interrogators that he decided on October 8 to desert the Viet Cong. He was captured on October 12 by two members of the self-defense corps in Binh Dinh Province.

South Viet-Nam authorities are skeptical of parts of Le Hoa's story. They believe he gave false details of the route his unit took into the South in order to protect his comrades who might follow. They doubt, too, that he decided to defect. Rather they think he became separated from his unit during an action, wandered aimlessly through the jungle for days, and then, weak from exhaustion and lack of food, lost any desire to resist capture. But that he was a Viet Cong soldier and that he came from North Viet-Nam as he claimed, there can be no doubt.

(Excerpts from Le Hoa's interrogation are in appendix G.)

## **5. The Diary of Nguyen Dinh Kieu**

IN AN ACTION NEAR DAKAKOI ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1961, armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam killed a number of Viet Cong. Among the dead was VC Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu. A diary was found in his pocket. The first entry was dated May 30, 1961; the final one, September 15.

The first section of Captain Kieu's diary contains organizational charts and other data on the VC company he commanded. The second section (37 pages) contains the captain's notes on his journey from North Viet-Nam to the South, on travel conditions, troop morale, political indoctrination, and other subjects.

The Kieu diary contains four separate organizational charts of the company, apparently reflecting periodic revisions caused by losses through combat, illness, and defections, and by the addition of new men. There are individual notations on the men in the company listing their ages, dates of entry into the army, party membership, and other details. The total strength of Kieu's unit ranged from 56 to 69 men, though at one point in his diary he noted that he had only 37 "effectives."

Captain Kieu and his Viet Cong company began their journey to the South on June 15, 1961. At midnight on that date they crossed the Ngan San River at Huong Khe in North Viet-Nam. They rested for 2 days at Thanh Lang. The entry for June 21 makes it clear that Kieu and his group were in Laos by that date.

"We rest at Thapachon, Kham Muon (the Laotian province of Khammouane)," he wrote. "It has taken us 2½ days to arrive here by foot. This friendly country is really beautiful and rich. Why are its people poor?"

By June 29, Captain Kieu and his men had reached the major Pathet Lao and Viet Cong base at Tchepone, where Soviet planes have been flying in supplies from Hanoi for several months. The company rested there for several days. On July 18 they crossed the border into South Viet-Nam.

"From this day on, I am in the Fatherland again," wrote Captain Kieu.

During the next 2 months Captain Kieu and his company operated in the Provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Kontum. They took part in the fighting around Konbrai early in September. A few days later Kieu noted the receipt of new weapons for his company—15 submachineguns, 4 machineguns, 8 automatic rifles. On September 15, the date of the final entry, the company was preparing defensive positions and planning propaganda activities among the people north of Konbrai. Eleven days later Captain Kieu was killed in action.

(Photocopies of sample pages from the Kieu diary and excerpts from the document are in appendix H.)



## D. INTRODUCTION OF SUPPLIES FROM THE NORTH

Through its clandestine channels into the South, the Viet Cong (VC) have sent not only espionage agents and military personnel but large quantities of military equipment and other supplies. As we have seen, the Viet Cong have been able to fill much of their logistical support requirement within their assigned regions—through military action, collection of “taxes,” ransom collections, outright robbery, rice seizures, and other illegal means. But the demand, particularly in view of heightened activity and the sharp increase in size of the Viet Cong establishment, has outpaced the local sources of supply.

Most of the things required by a military force in a combat zone have been sent at various times from the North to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. These include everything from TNT to tobacco. And since the VC operation is not only a military venture but one with a high political content, weapons for waging the propaganda war as well have been sent to the South. Among the latter are party pamphlets and newspapers, books, paper supplies, printing presses, and the like.

Some examples demonstrating the flow of supplies to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam follow.

### 1. The Calu Case (#2)

IN THE ATTACK ON THE CALU STATION of the secret trail network (described on page 28), Vietnamese Government forces also captured the notebook of a Viet Cong official, probably the commander of the Calu post. The document discusses many details related to infiltration activities. Included are records of weapons sent in over the secret trail for distribution to VC units in Quang Tri Province, in VC Zone 5, and in other areas.

The notations are in a simple code which Vietnamese intelligence analysts had little trouble interpreting because they had seen it before. The notebook listed the following war materiel as entering for distribution to Zone 5:

- 115 light machineguns and 75,054 rounds of ammunition
- 78 submachineguns and 26,758 rounds of ammunition
- 2,342 rifles and 488,388 rounds of ammunition

- 421 grenades
- 138 packages and 11 cases of explosives
- 287 cases of mines
- 382 cases of bombs
- 148 boxes of gunpowder

The following were sent in for use in Quang Tri:

- 40 light machineguns
- 80 submachineguns
- 12 pistols
- 308 rifles and 73,204 rounds of ammunition
- 24 grenade launchers
- 115 grenades

Supplies listed in the notebook for distribution to other areas:

- 35 light machineguns and 3,664 rounds of ammunition
- 243 submachineguns and 88,314 rounds of ammunition
- 702 rifles and 209,274 rounds of ammunition
- 502 kilograms of explosives
- 201 cases of mines
- 75 cases of bombs
- 9 boxes of gunpowder

South Vietnamese authorities estimate this quantity of military hardware could supply at least 30 regular companies of infantry. They are convinced that some of this equipment was used by the Viet Cong in their attack on Vietnamese Army outposts near Dakrotah in late 1960 and against Government units in the Kontum region early in September this year.

There is a small but interesting sidelight to the Calu officer's notebook. On one of the back pages there is an entry in the Russian language. It is the name and address in Moscow of a Vietnamese, presumably a friend of the notebook's owner.

(Photocopies of several pages from the VC officer's notebook are in appendix I.)

## 2. The Ly Son Case

ON JANUARY 31, 1960, a large junk with six men aboard landed at the island of Ly Son off the coast of Quang Ngai Province in South Viet-Nam. When questioned by the local

authorities, the men said they had come from the North to seek freedom in South Viet-Nam. The local security officials were inclined to believe the claims of the six, but there were enough discrepancies in their tales to create some doubts. The six men were transferred to provincial control and finally, in April, to Saigon.

That same month a high-ranking agent of the Viet Cong was captured in Long Khanh Province. His confession disclosed the real nature of the voyage of the six men who had come South in January. Confronted with this information, each of the six admitted that he had engaged in a special mission for the regime in the North. The six separate accounts of their journey tallied so closely with each other, even in small details, as to remove doubts about the real purpose of their trip to the South.

All six of the captured men were veterans of the Viet Cong movement; all had fought against the French and then had gone North after the Geneva agreements ended the Indochina war. Each was a member of the Lao Dong, or Communist, Party. And all six had been assigned the previous year to duty with the special maritime liaison group (Doan 603) which was responsible for using the sealanes to maintain contact with the Viet Cong in the South.

Nguyen Bat, alias Duong, a first lieutenant in the Viet Cong armed forces, was the leader of the six-man group. More than that, he was the commander of the sea transport company of the 603d Battalion, one of the two main elements in the liaison unit.

In October 1959 the 603d acquired two junks of about 5 tons each built in the North to resemble South Vietnamese junks as closely as possible. For the next 2 months Bat and his companions sailed their junk to become familiar with its handling, studied navigation and compass reading, and otherwise prepared for their mission. In December they received their orders: Deliver supplies to a Viet Cong liaison group located in Quang Nam Province. They were given forged identification papers, told how to act if captured, and given secret signals by which they could identify the correct landing site and the group that was to receive their cargo.

Bat listed the cargo his group took to the South as follows: 12 bolts of nylon cloth, 5 packages of white paper (large sheets), 8 bolts of black cloth, 20 cases of medicine, 2 tin boxes of rice seeds, 2 rolls of electric wire, a case of light bulbs, a case of batteries, 1 electric motor, a mimeograph machine, 1 case of printer's ink, 15 packages of documents, and 4 bundles of warm clothing (overcoats, sweaters, et cetera). He estimated the weight of the cargo at 2 tons.

Each member of the crew received clothing, a supply of food, some tobacco, and 1,000 piasters (about \$13.60) in South Vietnamese currency. The group was supplied with weapons in case they encountered any small boats that might cause trouble or expose them. The weapons included 6 submachineguns and 24 clips of ammunition, 18 grenades, and 6 knives.

Early on the morning of December 9, 1959, Bat and his crew went aboard to make their journey to the South. The others were Tran Muc, 34, deputy boat commander; Nguyen Nua, 38, who was the navigator or guide; Nguyen Xanh, 42; Nguyen Nu, 31; and Huynh Lac, 31—all crewmen. Bad weather forced them back to their base on the Gianh River. They tried again on December 14 with the same result.

On December 29 they set off for the third time and again the weather turned against them. Wind ripped the mainsail and they had to put into Ron. After a dispute with the local police because of their forged papers, they were finally permitted to return to their unit for repairs to the boat, and, apparently, a dressing-down from their superiors for their three failures.

On January 27 they sailed down the Gianh River and out to sea for the final time. They ran into several bad storms and had to take down the sails and drift. The weather eased during the night, but they ran into another and more severe storm the next morning. The rudder was broken and they spent hours trying to repair it. The patched rudder lasted only half an hour in the sea and then it broke again. They drifted southward all the next day.

On January 30 they tried once more to repair the damaged rudder but with little success. In the early morning hours of January 31 they saw a light. At first they thought it was a

patrol boat. Then they decided it must be Ly Son Island off the Quang Ngai coast.

What to do? They knew that, if they were caught with all their supplies, their mission would be exposed and they would spend years in prison. If they continued to drift out to sea, they would all probably die, for their water supply was almost exhausted. They decided to follow their orders: If in danger of immediate exposure, throw your cargo overboard and claim to be defectors from the North!

Over went the weapons and the cases of medicine. Some of the supplies floated and had to be retrieved and weighted down before they would sink. It was not easy to throw all that money into the sea. They tried at first to find a safe hiding place for it. They decided, however, that if it were found it would give them away, so it followed the weapons and the cargo to the bottom.

They drifted in to Ly Son and were picked up immediately by the local police. To save themselves, they claimed to be fleeing from the oppression of the Viet Cong. In fact, only the accident of bad weather prevented them from carrying out an important mission for the Viet Cong.

(Pictures of the six VC captured at Ly Son and excerpts from their detailed confessions are contained in appendix J.)

### 3. Northern Maps of the South

ONE ITEM PRODUCED IN HANOI that is virtually standard equipment for Viet Cong fighting units in the South is a map. For the most part, these North Vietnamese maps of the South are a 1956 issue based on information collected up to 1954. They are on a 1/100,000 scale. Some of the symbols and even some of the place names are different from those used on South Vietnamese maps.

Maps printed in the North have been picked up in many military actions in the South. A map of Quang Nam, for example, was found after the battle of Phuoc Son in September 1960. A map of Quang Tri was found at the secret trail post of Calu mentioned earlier. These maps are carried into South

Viet-Nam by Viet Cong cadres infiltrating from the North or are sent in along with other equipment by supply missions such as that described in the Ly Son case above.

#### **4. Medical Equipment From North Viet-Nam and the Communist Bloc**

IN THE LY SON CASE, see page 33, captured Viet Cong agents described the medical supplies they brought from the North as being of Western origin. But the requirements of a military force as large as that of the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam cannot always be met with Western supplies, because of both cost and limited sources. Attacks on clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies help the Viet Cong meet their own demands, but not entirely.

As a result the VC organization in the North has found it necessary occasionally to send to its units in the South medical supplies that originate in Hanoi or the Communist bloc. This has been true particularly of the more unusual kinds of medical equipment and supplies.

In attacks on Viet Cong units and camp sites, the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam has occasionally discovered medical supplies produced in the Sino-Soviet bloc which could only have been brought in from outside South Viet-Nam. Fighting in northern South Viet-Nam in August this year produced such supplies. In a series of clashes about 25 miles west of the provincial town of Darlac, a special Vietnamese combat team caught a Viet Cong medical unit by surprise and captured much of its equipment.

Included were stocks of medicines from Hungary, Bulgaria, and Communist China. There were rubber gloves, syringes, and a stethoscope from China and a large collection of medical instruments from a variety of countries. Three large medical charts were marked "Printed in Peking."

An attack by Government of Viet-Nam forces on a Viet Cong base near Ban Me Thuot early in October (see the Mai Xuan Phong case on page 41) resulted in the capture of medical supplies from North Viet-Nam. Included were vials of novocain,

atropine, and other drugs produced by the Xi Nghiep Duoc Pham (state-owned factory for pharmaceutical products) in North Viet-Nam.

No one seriously contends that the Viet Cong are getting all their supplies, equipment, food, and weapons from outside South Viet-Nam. We know, in fact, that they are able to get much of what they need from the areas in which their military units operate. Most of the methods used to get their supplies involve force, fear, or fabrication, but they are nonetheless effective.

However, we also know that the large and growing forces of the Viet Cong are not able to meet all their needs in this manner. There is too much evidence—in the testimony of their own personnel and in the nature of captured supplies—that demonstrates their reliance on supply lines from the North.

This flow of supplies from the North into South Viet-Nam—like the infiltration of agents and the introduction of military personnel—is a clear violation of the Geneva Accords, of course. Still, it goes on, day in and day out, and the pace is increasing as the size of the Viet Cong establishment grows.

(Pictures of Soviet-bloc medical supplies captured in South Viet-Nam are in appendix K.)

## E. LAOS AS A BASE AND A ROUTE FOR THE VIET CONG

It takes a rather special lens to be able to look at heightened Communist, that is, Pathet Lao, control over southeastern Laos and at sharply increased Communist, that is, Viet Cong, activity just across the border in South Viet-Nam, and to see nothing more than "coincidence." It is a lens that permits its wearer to fail to see what he chooses not to see.

In fact, of course, the two developments are intimately linked. The Viet Cong long have used infiltration routes through Laos and along the Viet-Nam-Laos border to send personnel from North Viet-Nam into the South. Now, with their friends of the Pathet Lao in control of an increasing number of villages and roads in eastern Laos, the Viet Cong

are able to move units of considerable size across the border without fear of exposure or opposition.

## 1. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos

THE GOVERNMENT IN HANOI has angrily denied charges that some of its military units were engaged in the fighting in Laos. It has claimed these were provocative allegations without foundation in fact. Intelligence reports and the testimony of prisoners captured in Laos tell a different story.

Since last December, North Viet-Nam has been the base from which the extensive Soviet airlift of supplies to the Pathet Lao has operated. North Vietnamese technicians have been instructing the Pathet Lao in guerrilla warfare and in the use of artillery. But beyond this, troops of the regular Army of North Viet-Nam have been stationed in Laos for training purposes and to conduct combat missions.

Nguyen Van Nham, a lieutenant in the North Vietnamese Army was captured during the battle of Van Mieng in Laos. He identified himself as an officer of the 335th Division of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Vi Van Sang, who handled an 81 mm. mortar, was captured in the battle of Pha Tang. He said he belonged to the 925th Battalion of the North Viet-Nam Army. Ne Tong, a private, second class, was picked up in the fighting at Nong Het. He told interrogators he was a soldier of the 120th Regiment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Army.

(Photographs and statements of these three North Vietnamese soldiers captured in Laos are attached in appendix L.)

Do Luc, whose case is reported on page 40, wrote in his diary of fighting in Laos with his unit before he was assigned to join the Viet Cong military effort in South Viet-Nam.

These pieces of evidence merely reinforce reports gathered from many sources that there were, indeed, North Vietnamese soldiers in Laos. The principal units involved were the 335th Division; its component regiments—the 83d, 280th, and 673d; the 120th Independent Regiment; and the 359th Frontier Guard Regiment.



## 2. The Movement of North Vietnamese Troops From Laos Into South Viet-Nam

THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE UNITS IN LAOS is disturbing to the Government of South Viet-Nam on two counts. *First*, it means that much of northeastern and southeastern Laos is under control of the Communists. *Second*, and even more upsetting, is the knowledge that regular units of the North Viet-Nam Army are in a position to move readily into South Viet-Nam to fight with the Viet Cong whenever the high command in Hanoi decides they are needed.

The fact is that for some time, particularly since the cease-fire went into effect in Laos in May, Viet Cong fighters have moved with increasing frequency into South Viet-Nam through the Lao corridor.

In a fight with the Viet Cong in the central highlands, near the village of Daktrum on September 3, 1961, South Vietnamese forces killed a VC soldier. In his pocket was found a small, homemade diary. In it he had jotted down remembrances, personal experiences, notes to his wife or sweetheart, and comments on things as varied as the weather and the Communist Party.

The diary is headed "Do Luc," presumably the VC soldier's name or alias. It bears the notation H-602, presumably a personal or unit code designation.

Some of the notations are significant. Do Luc recalled his days fighting with the Viet Cong against the French and his decision in April 1955 to leave his family and friends behind and move to the North. In December 1960 he was ordered to go with his unit to Laos to help "destroy the reactionary gang of Phoumi-Boun Oum (General Phoumi Nosavan and Prime Minister Boun Oum)."

When the fighting slowed in Laos, he was sent to South Viet-Nam to join the Viet Cong effort. He noted crossing the Laos-Viet-Nam border on May 4, 1961, and in June he wrote of his feelings at being back once again in Quang Nam Province, VC Interzone 5, which he had left 6 years before.

(Reproduction of several pages of the Do Luc diary, together with the translation of key passages, is in appendix M.)

Do Luc was but one of many Viet Cong soldiers who moved into South Viet-Nam through Laos. Some of the forces that carried out the attack in the Dakrotah area (see page 29) were believed to have entered Viet-Nam through Laos and after the action to have withdrawn across the Laos-Viet-Nam border.

On September 18, 1961, in Saigon national police arrested a man named Vo Van Tan, alias Vo Hoa Mi, during a routine check of identification documents. A member of the Viet Cong, Tan had moved to the North at the end of the Indochina war. In April of this year, he said, he was assigned to a special 250-man battalion, Independent Battalion No. 2, to fight in South Viet-Nam. After 6 weeks of training designed to familiarize them with U.S. weapons and guerrilla tactics, Tan and his unit left Hoa Binh Province in North Viet-Nam on June 20. They marched south along the Laos-Viet-Nam border and through the Lao Province of Khammouane.

They entered South Viet-Nam across the border of Quang Nam Province. Then they moved south through the Provinces of Kontum and Darlac to the area west of Ban Me Thuot.

Tan told his interrogators that he decided to defect after his battalion suffered heavy losses in a fight on August 26. He stole 95,000 piasters (about \$1,292) from the battalion finance section and made his way to Saigon. He was arrested during a document check at the An Dong bus station.

(A picture of Vo Van Tan and a summary of his confession are in appendix N.)

On October 3, 1961, near the town of Ban Me Thuot, an Army unit of the Republic of Viet-Nam attacked a Viet Cong camp. In their haste the VC left behind some medical supplies and documents. Among the latter was a small notebook kept by a man named Mai Xuan Phong, a medical corpsman or doctor of the Viet Cong.

The notebook bore the seal "Tong Cong Ty Bach Hoa" (literally, General Company for a Hundred Things), a state-owned enterprise in North Viet-Nam. In the back pages were entered the words of a popular Vietnamese song. In the front Mai Xuan Phong had recorded at irregular intervals his activities between April and September.

He noted, for example, his departure on a "new mission" on April 20, 1961. Two days later he recorded his departure from North Viet-Nam into Laos. He passed through and rested at Muong Phine, southwest of Tchepone. On June 1 he was at the border of Laos and South Viet-Nam and wrote that he had then been away from his native South for 6 years.

On June 10, Mai Xuan Phong arrived at the border of Kontum Province. One month later he wrote that his group had entered Cambodia. By August 7, Phong was in Darlac in the southwest highlands of Viet-Nam, and 2 days later he was assigned to a small armed unit of two squads composed of highland tribesmen with two Vietnamese cadres.

In September, Phong joined a new Viet Cong unit. He reported that it carried out a large-scale attack on the land development center of Quang Nhieu, near Ban Me Thuot, on September 21. He wrote that many documents and military supplies were seized in the attack and that his group had gathered together 400 local citizens to propagandize and win support for the policy of the Front for Liberation of the South.

(Copies of pages from the Mai Xuan Phong diary and a translation of the document are in appendix O.)

The increased use of the Lao corridor by the Viet Cong is responsible for much of the heightened pace of VC activity in the central highlands region and in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam. As noted earlier, there have been at least five major attacks by VC forces of from 500 to 1,000 men in those areas in recent months. South Vietnamese patrols operating along the Viet-Nam-Laos border have had several engagements with VC units moving toward the highlands from Laos.

It should be noted, too, that Soviet transport planes flying from North Viet-Nam have been airlifting supplies into Tchepone, only 20 miles from the Viet-Nam border in east-central Laos, since spring. Military equipment has been landed at the Tchepone airport and has been dropped by parachute as well. The Tchepone region is believed to be a major base of operations for the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao. The airport there was improved in mid-September and the frequency of flights by Soviet transports has increased since then.

## **F. THE GOAL OF THE "LIBERATION" MOVEMENT: COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER ALL VIET-NAM**

We saw in an earlier section (see IV above) that the Communist leaders in North Viet-Nam have made a poorly kept secret of their support for and control over the so-called "liberation" movement in the South. In recent years thousands of documents—propaganda pamphlets, party directives, study papers, action plans, and the like—reflecting this control have been picked up by the authorities in the South. These documents demonstrate a number of important facets of the Viet Cong movement and its "cover" organization, the Liberation Front. They expose both the short-run tactics of the movement as well as its long-range goals. The central objective is clear and unmistakable: to overthrow the legal Government in South Viet-Nam and to absorb that country and its people into the Communist orbit.

A look at a sampling of Viet Cong documentary material is instructive for anyone who would understand what their methods and goals are.

### **1. Communist Party Cadres in the South**

ON MAY 18, 1961, the Liberation Front radio broadcast acknowledged the leadership of the Lao Dong Party, that is, of the Communist Party. After discussing the decisions of the Lao Dong Party Congress of October 1960, the "Voice" of the Liberation Front said:

"In general, the above-mentioned decision of the Third Congress of the Lao Dong Party concerning the revolution to be carried out in South Viet-Nam has been correctly executed by the delegate of the party for South Viet-Nam and the different echelons of the party . . . ."

The same broadcast added:

"In order to meet the exigencies of the revolution and to meet the new situation which the revolution faces, all of us—cadres and members of the front as well as those who love their fatherland and the revolution in South Viet-Nam—must

strictly execute the basic and immediate mission determined by the party. . . ."

The fact that Lao Dong (Communist) Party agents are at work in the Viet Cong program of conquest in South Viet-Nam is well known. Many of them have been arrested and have confessed regarding their activities. Clear documentary evidence of one such case was uncovered by a Republic of Viet-Nam military unit late in October.

In an attack on a Viet Cong base north of Saigon on October 26, Vietnamese troops overran a small medical unit and seized quantities of documents. Among them were the medical and party records of a man named Huynh Van Cuong. He was a party activist, aged 36, with the rank of captain.

The medical record sheet shows clearly the direct involvement of the regime in Hanoi with the Viet Cong. It is headed "DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM," with the subheading "Independence-Liberty-Happiness." The report sheet was from "The Military Medical Office, Medical Section 108." The record showed that Captain Cuong was suffering from a lung ailment.

Party documents attached to the medical record were equally informative. One was a certificate of introduction from his parent party body, Chapter 11, E 400 of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam. It noted Cuong's membership in good standing (his dues were paid through March 1961!) and asked that he be permitted to carry out special party activities in his new area of assignment. It was addressed to the party's Organizing Committee, F 351.

A second document was a certificate of announcement, signifying receipt of the introduction certificate. This, too, was addressed to F 351 to be completed by the party officials of that body. Apparently Cuong was too ill to submit the latter form to the proper authorities, for it was not receipted by the Viet Cong officials in his new post.

(Photocopies of Huynh Van Cuong's medical and party records are in appendix P, item 1.)

## **2. Party Leadership of Front Organizations**

AS NOTED EARLIER, the Liberation Front is composed of separate "liberation" groups for various categories of citizens—

for peasants, youth, women, workers, and so forth. Behind the scenes, control over these groups is held by the Lao Dong Party.

A document titled "A Draft Program of Action and Rules of Procedure for the Association of Peasants for Liberation" was picked up by South Vietnamese security agents in Dinh Tuong Province. It illustrates the point:

(On p. 2)—"The Association of Peasants for Liberation, together with all the other classes and revolutionary forces belonging to the Popular Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam, will contribute to strengthening the links of solidarity among the working classes under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam. . . ."

The security service captured a "Research Document on the Organization of Peasants Association" in Bien Hoa Province on February 8, 1961. It says, in part:

(On p. 4)—"Our final victory will depend on our policy in rural areas. The Front's policy should be in deep harmony with the laboring class and should be placed under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, . . ."

(On p. 6)—"Under what leadership should the Peasants Association be placed?"

"The Peasants Association accepts the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam because: imperialism and feudalism, concretely represented by the U.S.-Diem clique, are the peasants' enemies and have always exploited and oppressed the peasants; on the other hand, the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam has always led the fight against imperialists and feudalists, and for the liberation of the people. . . ."

Similarly, the military units of the "liberation" movement accept the leadership of the Communist Party. A letter from the commanding officer of Company 265 of the Viet Cong, addressed to officers and men of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam stationed in Truc Giang in Kien Hoa Province, in April 1960 said:

"The policy of the revolution and the responsibility of the entire population in the fight against colonialism and feudalism, under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam,

is to annihilate imperialism and feudalism, to give land to the tillers, and to lay the foundation for the building of socialism and communism. . . ."

(Copies of the above documents are in appendix P, item 2.)

### 3. Calls for More Aggressive Action

SECURITY AGENTS IN BIEN HOA PROVINCE found a VC directive dated January 23, 1961, with the title "Instructions on the Creation of People's Self-Defense Units." It was signed "Thin, for 12," with "12" apparently a headquarters unit designation. It said:

(On p. 1)—"Our present and future responsibility is to create armed self-defense units. The creation of armed self-defense units is based on the following four points:

"1) take the offensive in order to eliminate the enemy and protect the movement.

"2) our activity among the people is [through] the Front; propagandize in order to rally the people; organize basic revolutionary cells in order to build political forces among the people.

"3) try to achieve self-sufficiency.

"4) create a reserve force. . . ."

Police in Saigon picked up in early 1961 a Viet Cong pamphlet titled "Instructions Regarding Activities in Cities." It said:

(On p. 1)—"The responsibility and main goals that our Party has in view are to develop activities in the countryside, to increase activity in the cities, to reoccupy our former resistance bases, to extend our security zones, to limit the field of action and control of the enemy."

(Copies of the above documents are attached in appendix P, item 8.)

### 4. The Policy of Forcible Seizure of Power

AT THE END OF 1960 a GVN unit attacked and seized a Viet Cong district headquarters in Dinh Tuong Province. One of the casualties was a VC district commissioner named Nguyen Van Van. He had in his possession a notebook in which he had

recorded the outline of a VC training course. Among other things, he noted the following:

"Our purposes: To incite the people to rise against the U.S.-Diem clique in order to achieve the objective of the revolutionary liberation of the South. The enemy is now implementing a dreadful policy to oppress the people (for example, decree no. 10/59, agrovilles, etc.). The people should stand up and fight against them, using all means, legal and illegal, political and military. . . .

"Whether we should resort to the use of arms or not depends on the actual situation at the moment. This should not occur too early or too late, and it is only up to the Central Committee to determine when the time is appropriate and reach a decision.

"The revolution in the South at the present time has two possibilities:

"—general uprising to seize power.

"—a long-term armed struggle.

"But our final objective is a general uprising to seize power."

(Excerpts from the VC commissioner's notebook are in appendix P, item 4.)

## **5. Party Policy Toward the Front**

In an attack on a forest hideout of a Viet Cong district chief at Thai Hoa (Phuoc Thanh Province), Government security forces captured instructions to party members "Concerning the Organization of Committees in the Popular Front." It was dated March 28, 1961, and was addressed to the VC in the Thu-Bien (Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa) area.

The document urged party members to begin immediately to organize Liberation Front committees in villages and towns. It noted that there should be at least two party members working openly on these committees but that the number should be governed by the extent of Viet Cong control over the village. The document also said: "To secure a broad base of representation within the Front, the number of Party members on committees of the Popular Front should not exceed two-fifths of the total membership."

(A copy of the Thu-Bien "Instructions" is included in appendix P, item 5.)



## **6. Deceptive Appeal for Broad Support of the "Liberation" Movement Is a Temporary Policy of the Communist Party**

Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces, while carrying out an operation in Tay Ninh Province on February 15, 1961, captured a copy of instructions from the Viet Cong Regional Committee of the South. It was addressed to interprovincial committees.

In these instructions the regional leadership emphasized that the policy of appealing for support from all strata and groups for the "liberation" movement was a temporary tactic. It noted that many people in these groups—intellectuals, young people, bourgeois elements, wealthy peasants, et cetera—were unreliable.

The document states:

"In the present situation of South Viet-Nam, the Central Committee of the Party supports integration of these elements into the Front, not because the Party is betraying the policy of class struggle and of the revolution, not because the Party is going to entrust these classes with heavy responsibilities in the revolutionary liberation of South Viet-Nam, but only to utilize their abilities and their prestige in order to push forward the revolution and to give more prestige to the People's Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam.

"This line of conduct is only a temporary policy of the Party. When the revolution is crowned with success, this policy will be revised. Then the Party will act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam."

(A photocopy of the original document and excerpt are included in appendix P, item 6.)

## **7. Policy of Violence by the Viet Cong**

IN AN ATTACK ON A VIET CONG ESTABLISHMENT IN Long An Province on August 15, 1961, a Republic of Viet-Nam Army unit seized a document containing instructions to the VC provincial committee from the Inter-Province Committee of the Central Region.

The document analyzed certain shortcomings in VC activities and urged that they be corrected. It also issued specific instructions as follows:

1. Special caution should be used in handling members of the civil guard who defected to the Viet Cong. "They might be spies." Such persons should be subjected to thorough investigation for a period of 3 months.

"After this period," the instructions added, "if the case remains suspicious, immediately liquidate the suspect to avoid further trouble for the revolution."

2. "Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors."

3. "Step up activities [aimed at] encircling and paralyzing strategic roads, means of communication used for transporting rice, pigs, and charcoal, such as canals and most particularly inter-provincial road no. 4. These activities are aimed at ruining the economy of the enemy, of raising the cost of living in the city of Saigon."

The document noted that the VC in Long An and Dinh Tuong had sunk during the month of June five boats carrying charcoal and eight carrying rice and confiscated three truckloads of pigs. These actions were cited as "deserving our praise."

(A photocopy of the captured document is in appendix P, item 7.)

## VII. *The Present Danger*

The Communist program to take over South Viet-Nam has moved into a new and more dangerous phase. Political and propaganda activity has been stepped up. More important, the Viet Cong have advanced from relatively small actions and hit-and-run tactics, common to the early phase of a guerrilla-type operation, to the employment of larger units and more sophisticated strategy.

At first concerned only with gathering enough rice and other food supplies to meet their own needs, the Viet Cong this year sought through a variety of techniques to choke off the flow of food to Saigon and thereby to deal the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam a mortal economic blow. They were aided by nature in the form of floods, the most serious in decades, in the southern delta.

In the military field a series of carefully planned and well-executed moves by the RVN military forces in the delta region caused heavy casualties among the Viet Cong and set back their timetable. But they retaliated with a number of major attacks in the North and in the central highlands. For the first time, Viet Cong units of 500 to 1,000 or more troops were thrown into action at a number of points—at Dakha, north of Kontum; near Ban Me Thuot; at Phuoc Vinh; and in the northern Provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Tri.

Control over the Lao corridor by friendly Pathet Lao troops has permitted the Viet Cong to move with impunity along the infiltration trails in that area into South Viet-Nam. A Soviet airlift has provided large stocks of military supplies to Tchepone, only 20 miles from the South Viet-Nam border.

Junk traffic from North Viet-Nam to the South increased during the summer. In June, for example, South Vietnamese patrols seized 21 boats from the North with 100 Viet Cong aboard. Given the Government's shortage of adequate equipment and trained personnel to counter this kind of activity, it must be assumed that many more Viet Cong junks were able to complete their missions.

That the Viet Cong have stepped up their efforts to win control in the South is evident. However, this development did not come as a surprise to officials in the RVN Government. The acceleration had been accurately forecast in a number of documents captured from the Viet Cong earlier in the year. One of the most detailed and specific of these documents was seized on May 12 at Hat Dich in Phuoc Tuy Province.

The document bears the title "Military Plan of the Provincial Party Committee at Baria." (Baria is the former name of Phuoc Tuy.) It described in minute detail plans for building up the Viet Cong guerrilla force in the region. It set as the

party's goal recruitment of at least 36,000 "volunteers" for guerilla action in Baria, to be divided into four battalions, three independent companies, and two platoons, with a reserve force of six companies and two platoons. Some of the recruits would be used for espionage, communications, liaison, and sabotage.

The Baria military plan gives a good indication of Viet Cong ambitions and methods of organization.

(A copy of the military plan is in appendix Q.)

## VIII. *Conclusions*

It is impossible to look at South Viet-Nam today without recognizing the clear and present danger of Communist conquest. The people of South Viet-Nam and their friends in other countries must look soberly at this problem and at the likely consequences should the Viet Cong succeed.

### A. THE MEANING OF A VIET CONG VICTORY

For the people of South Viet-Nam the meaning of a Communist victory is obvious. They would join their compatriots in the North within the Communist orbit. They would take their place alongside the North Koreans, the Tibetans, the Hungarians, the East Germans, and others in the conformity of an "order" ruled by Moscow and Peiping.

Those who had opposed the Viet Cong would swiftly be eliminated. "Land for the tillers" would become "land for the state." Promises of "autonomy" for minority peoples would be forgotten except by the disillusioned highland tribes themselves. Absolute political control would rest with the Communist Party. In short, the pattern of Communist domination and dictatorship would be imposed over the entire country, and 14 million able and energetic people would find themselves in the "socialist camp."

For Viet-Nam's neighbors the consequences of a Communist victory in all Viet-Nam would be far-reaching. It would

doubtless seal the fate of Laos, where the Communists already control about half the country. Cambodia's precarious neutrality would be subjected to heavy and steadily increasing pressure. Thailand, too, would have to expect to see the tactics used in Laos and in Viet-Nam directed against her.

The present balance of forces between independent and Communist states in Asia would be tipped perilously if Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos fell under Communist domination. What then would be the prospects for Thailand and Burma, for Pakistan and India, for Malaya and Indonesia?

If the Viet Cong effort proves successful in Viet-Nam, other states with Communist neighbors are likely to be exposed to similar covert and overt methods of aggression. It is not logical to expect that the Communists will abandon techniques that prove successful. Conversely, failure in Viet-Nam might prove an important deterrent to repetition elsewhere.

## B. THE NEED FOR ACTION

The responsibility for meeting and overcoming the Viet Cong threat falls primarily on the people of South Viet-Nam and on their Government. Their stake is by far the largest of all those involved. It is their country, their lives, their future that are most directly in danger.

The Republic of Viet-Nam must cope with aggression that almost daily increases in intensity and scope. As units of larger size have moved in from the North, the nature of the war in South Viet-Nam has changed from one of an almost entirely guerrilla character toward one with the proportions of conventional warfare. The size of engagements fought recently testifies to the accelerated pace of Viet Cong infiltration.

To overcome this steadily growing threat will require courage, intelligence, energy, and imagination. But these are all qualities that the people of South Viet-Nam have in abundance. The Government of the Republic has recognized the necessity to step up its effort to meet the increasing threat from subversion and covert aggression.

North Viet-Nam, in guiding and supporting the Viet Cong effort, has had the full backing of Moscow, Peiping, and the

rest of the Communist world. It is too much to expect that the people of South Viet-Nam would be able to oppose this massive threat without outside support. The United States and other friendly countries have already contributed much to the cause of strengthening South Viet-Nam's military and economic programs. In the face of heightened efforts by the Viet Cong, more assistance may be needed. The problem here is to work out cooperatively the kind of assistance program that is likely to prove most effective in meeting the present danger.

The world community itself bears some responsibility toward the people of South Viet-Nam. It is not enough for other non-Communist states to point to their own serious problems and to shrug their shoulders and ask: "What can *we* do?" We can all do much. First, we can try to understand the situation that prevails in South Viet-Nam, the real and not the imagined situation. We can look hard at the facts and come to realize that what is happening in the villages and in the highlands of South Viet-Nam does not reflect the will or the desires of that country's people.

One need not accept the word of others. Any friendly government can send in its own observers to see for themselves. It can consult closely with those on or near the scene who know most about what has been happening in Viet-Nam. Free men could, if they would, force a halt to such things as infiltration through Laos and the use of neighboring territories as "safe" bases for Viet Cong operations.

Viet-Nam is not an isolated problem. The tactics used there have been used before. They will be used again, particularly if they prove successful. A government or a people who now think that "Viet-Nam is so far away from us" may well discover that they are the South Vietnamese of tomorrow. Then they may wish they had done more now. But then it will be late, very late, perhaps too late!